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THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF PUBLIC SECTOR
ARBITRATION AWARDS
By, Gilbert A. Cornfield
Gilbert A Cornfield is a founding partner of Cornfield and Feldman in Chicago. The firm represents
labor organizations in the public and private sectors. Mr. Cornfield has also been an adjunct instructor
in labor law and arbitration at IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law.

I. INTRODUCTION
On February 22, 2013 the Supreme Court of Illinois issued a significant decision
in Griggsville-Perry Community Unit School District No. 4 v. lELRB.[1]
delineating the standards for judicial review of arbitration awards in the public
sector. This commentary will review the substance of the decision, the relevant
statutes and the decisions of the Illinois Appellate Court which preceded the
Illinois Supreme Court’s decision.
II. BACKGROUND TO THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT’S
DECISION IN GRIGGSVILLE-PERRY
The litigation leading to the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision began when a public
school district terminated the employment of a paraprofessional employee who
had eleven years of service. The employee was a member of a bargaining unit
covered by a collective bargaining agreement between the district and a labor
organization.
The union filed a grievance contesting the dismissal. The union argued that the
allegations of misconduct that were presented to the school board by the school
administration had not been communicated to the employee nor placed in her
personnel file. The union also contended that the school board had not fairly
followed the procedures for employee discipline set forth in the collective
bargaining agreement.[2] In support of the grievance, the union referenced
provisions in the collective bargaining agreement which required the maintenance
of employee personnel files and gave employees the right to appear before the
school board when discipline was considered.
The school board contended that the grievance was not subject to arbitration
because the collective bargaining agreement did not restrict its right to dismiss
employees and therefore the members of the bargaining unit were “at will”
employees.[3] Alternatively, the school board argued that it had complied with the
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collective bargaining agreement in that the terminated employee had the right to
appear before the school board and advance any arguments or facts which
militated against her dismissal.
The grievance went to impartial arbitration. After protracted hearings before the
arbitrator and an interim decision by the Illinois Educational Labor Relations
Board (IELRB), the arbitrator issued his final decision holding that the discharge
violated the collective bargaining agreement because the employee had not been
given notice of the alleged misconduct and the allegations were not sufficiently
specified to enable her to respond before the school board voted to dismiss
her. The board voted to terminate before the employee had been notified of the
administration’s recommendation to terminate and the board’s vote of
approval. The arbitrator also held that although the collective bargaining
agreement did not set forth any substantive standards for employee discipline, and
discharge, the procedural provisions of the agreement required that an employee
be provided with advance notice and specific information with respect to the
administration’s allegations of misconduct in support of the recommended
discipline, and an opportunity to respond before the school board acted on the
administration’s recommendation.[4] The arbitrator ordered that the employee be
reinstated to her position and be made whole for losses of income and benefits she
had incurred since her dismissal.[5] The arbitrator further held that should the
school administration decide to recommend the employee’s dismissal after she
returned to her employment, the necessary procedures that the arbitrator specified
were to be followed.[6]
The school board refused to honor the arbitrator’s award, resulting in the union
filing an unfair labor practice charge with the IELRB. The IELRB held that the
arbitrator’s award was enforceable.[7] The school district appealed to the
Appellate Court for the Fourth District. The three judge appellate panel, with one
dissenter, held that the arbitrator’s decision was not enforceable because it went
beyond the unambiguous terms of the collective bargaining agreement, imposing
on the school board standards for dismissing an employee which were not set forth
in the agreement.[8]
III. THE DECISION OF THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court, holding that the IELRB
did not err in deciding that the arbitrator’s decision drew its “essence” from the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement. The agreement provided:
When a member of the bargaining unit is required to appear before the Board of
Education concerning any disciplinary matter, the staff member shall be given reasonable
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prior written notice of the reasons for such meeting and shall be entitled to have a
personal representative at said meeting, if so requested by employee.[9]
The Illinois Supreme Court quoted from the arbitrator’s opinion and award in applying the aforesaid
provision to the evidence before him:
[Section 2.6 of the] collective bargaining agreement requires ‘written notices of the
reasons for’ the employee being heard before the school board. The District maintains
that the written notice it provided was adequate. The Arbitrator disagrees. The notice
merely stated that the board proposed to dismiss [Hires] for ‘deficiencies’ in that she did
not ‘relate well’ to students and ‘was not always pleasant.’***[S]uch generalized
characterizations are impossible to defend against, which was one of the grounds of the
union’s initial grievance. It bears repetition that adequate notice is a fundamental
element of the hearing process. When what is to be heard are allegations of misconduct
or poor or inadequate performance the accused employee must be able to ‘marshal
evidence and prepare his [or her] case so as to benefit from any hearing that was
provided.’ Henry J. Friendly, ‘Some Kind of Hearing’,[123 U.Pa.L.Rev.1267, 1281
(1975)]. At a minimum, [Hires] was entitled to the specifics of the factual allegations
giving rise to the generalized conclusion she was confronted with – the names, dates, and
circumstances of the allegations, precisely what facts were reported of her and by whom,
and, where the facts are contested, to confront her accusers and adduce any evidence in
her defense.[10]

The key elements of the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision are:
1. The question of whether an arbitrator’s award draws its “essence” from the
bargaining agreement is a matter of “law.”[11] It should be noted that although the
matter had come before the Illinois Supreme Court on review from an IELRB
decision, the court did not specifically defer to the Labor Board, but reached its
own determination that the arbitrator’s decision was based upon his interpretation
and application of the collective bargaining agreement.
2. The correctness of an arbitrator’s decision interpreting and applying the terms
of a collective bargaining agreement is not within the scope of appellate
review. The Illinois Supreme Court stated that it is insufficient to show that the
arbitrator “committed an error or even a serious error” to overturn the
award.[12] In this regard, however, the Supreme Court of Illinois noted that an
arbitrator’s decision, although purporting to be based upon contract terms, may be
set aside on review if the arbitrator’s interpretation is not “plausible” and cannot
be ascribed to mere error but supports an inference that the award has some basis
outside the agreement.[13]
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The Illinois Supreme Court held that the Appellate Court had exceeded its review
authority by imposing its own interpretation and application of the relevant
contract provision and rejecting the procedural and informational rights that the
arbitrator had determined were inherent in the provision. Although the Supreme
Court in this context referenced the Appellate Court’s majority decision, it is
reasonable that the Supreme Court would require the same standards to be
followed for direct review of a Labor Board decision.
IV.

THE LEGISLATIVE AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE
ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT’S DECISION

The governing public employee labor legislation in Illinois became effective in
1984. Griggsville-Perry was the first and as of this date the only time the Supreme
Court of Illinois has addressed the standards to be followed in determining
whether arbitration awards interpreting and applying provisions of public sector
collective bargaining agreements are to be enforced under the Illinois public sector
labor laws. In Board of Education of Community School District No.1 Coles
County v. Compton,[14] the Illinois Supreme Court held that the an arbitrator’s
award was subject to exclusive review by the IELRB through the unfair labor
practice procedures under the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act
(IELRA),[15] and thereafter subject to direct appeal to the Appellate
Court. The Coles County decision dealt only with the procedures to be followed for
review of arbitration awards, not the substantive standards to be applied in the
review. Both the IELRA and the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (IPLRA),[16]
governing public employees other than educational personnel, require collective
bargaining agreements to include binding arbitration to resolve disputes over their
administration or interpretation. The IPLRA provides that the arbitration
provisions are subject to the Illinois Uniform Arbitration Act (IUAA).[17] Thus, the
Illinois courts have held that review of arbitration decisions under the IPLRA are
within the authority of the Circuit Courts as provided by the IUAA.[18]
Although Griggsville-Perry involved an arbitration award under the IELRA, it is
fair to conclude that the standards for review of arbitration awards established by
the court are equally applicable to awards under collective bargaining agreements
governed by the IPLRA. The starting point of the Illinois Supreme Court’s
“Analysis” in Griggsville-Perry was the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court in United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing
Co.[19] and United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp. in
1960.[20] In those decisions, the United States Supreme Court held that
arbitration awards interpreting and applying private sector collective bargaining
agreements under the Labor-Management Relations Act are judicially enforceable
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if the decision “draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement”[21] Quoting a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, the Griggsville-Perry court stated that an arbitration award can only be
set aside when it is “shown that there is no ‘interpretive route to the award, so a
noncontractual basis can be inferred and the award set aside.”[22] There is no
reason to conclude that the Illinois Supreme Court would apply different standards
for reviewing arbitration awards under collective bargaining agreements under
either the IELRA or the IPLRA.
V. THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF GRIGGSVILLE-PERRY
The Illinois Supreme Court has made it clear that the party seeking to overturn an
arbitration award resolving a dispute under the terms of a public sector collective
bargaining agreement faces a substantial burden. Although the court has not
provided an exact formula for determining whether an arbitration award is to be
sustained, there are certain general conclusions which logically follow from the
decision:
1. The more detailed and less ambiguous the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement, the more likely the arbitration award will be held to involve the
interpretation or application of those terms and therefore “draws its essence from
the agreement.”
2. However, it is more than likely that the parties have resorted to arbitration
because the dispute is over ambiguous contract terms or over the application of
such terms to specific situations. For example, the collective bargaining
agreement in Griggsville-Perry provided that an employee subject to discipline
had the right to appear before the school board. The issue in dispute was whether
the right to appear was limited to a physical appearance or included procedural
rights inherent to the right to a hearing before the school board. The Illinois
Supreme Court held that the arbitrator acted within the scope of his authority in
determining that the right to appear before the school board entitled the right of
the employee to be informed of the specific charges against her and the effective
opportunity to respond, including the right to submit countervailing
evidence.[23] The court therefore held that as a matter of law the Appellate Court
had overstepped its limited review authority by determining that the employee’s
only contract right was to appear and be heard before the school board.[24]
One could conclude that the primary lesson to be learned from the Illinois Supreme
Court’s decision is that the parties to collective bargaining should make every effort
to create a document that is free of ambiguity. However, that is unlikely to
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occur. Except for wage rates and benefits and certain very defined working
conditions, important governing terms are often expressed as general standards to
be followed rather than a litany of specific instances. For example, an employer’s
right to discipline including discharge is conditioned by a “just cause”
standard. Another example might be a provision that conditions an employer’s
right to lay off employees when “necessary.” Another would be a senior employee’s
right to be promoted if the employee’s skills are “substantially equivalent” to junior
employees qualified for the job. In all these examples there are a myriad of fact
situations to which these general standards are to be applied and which will lend
themselves to disputes even if the facts are not controverted. Even if the parties to
the collective bargaining agreement were intent on minimizing disputes during the
contract term, the ability to identify every specific situation which would come
within the purview of the standard is impractical and would render bargaining
interminable. It is fair to conclude that the Supreme Court of Illinois recognized
the reality of negotiating collective bargaining agreements and the necessary role
served by arbitrators in resolving the inherent ambiguity when contract provisions
are applied to specific situations which arise during the term of an agreement.
The Court’s opinion in Griggsville-Perry made special note of the Appellate
Court’s 1992 decision in Board of Education of Harrisburg Community Unit
School District No. 3 v. IELRB.[25] The Appellate Court in Harrisburg reversed
the decision of the IELRB to enforce part of the arbitrator’s remedial order. The
arbitrator had found that the school board had violated the due process rights of a
teacher in terminating the teacher’s extracurricular assignment.[26] The
arbitrator further held that the school board was held to a “just cause” standard
with respect to the merits of the termination if the proper procedures were
followed.[27] The collective bargaining agreement did not set forth a specific
standard for terminating an extracurricular assignment addressing only the
procedure to be followed. However, the arbitrator employed the “just cause”
standard as commonly used in collective bargaining agreements. The IELRB held
that the arbitrator’s use of the just cause standard was within the scope of the
arbitrator’ authority.[28]
The Harrisburg decision may appear to be contrary to the Illinois Supreme Court’s
ruling that an arbitrator is to be given broad latitude in applying the provisions of
a bargaining agreement. The Illinois Supreme Court apparently recognized the
potential conflict between its holding in Griggsville-Perry and the Appellate
Court’s holding in Harrisburg. The Illinois Supreme Court relied on the
bargaining history of the contract language in Harrisburg to create an exception
to the deference to be accorded an arbitrator. The Supreme Court stated:
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Harrisburg thus stands for the proposition that, in those instances where bargaining
history established that a just-cause standard was discussed but not adopted, the
arbitrator is precluded from incorporating such a standard into a collective-bargaining
agreement. Harrisburg does not state, however, that an arbitrator is precluded from
finding any standard for dismissal at all.[29]

The Court then noted that “[t]he arbitrator here declined to read a just-cause
requirement into the parties’ agreement in light of the relevant bargaining history
but, instead, concluded that the District’s decision to discharge Hires was subject
to
a
standard
of
arbitrariness.
This
was
entirely
consistent
with Harrisburg.[30] We note, in this regard, that the record before the arbitrator
in Griggsville-Perry was undisputed that both the school board and the union’s
proposals with respect to the standards for employee discipline, including
termination, had been withdrawn by mutual consent in order to reach agreement
on a first bargaining agreement following the union’s certification as the
bargaining representative. The arbitration record further established that after the
negotiations for the first contract the parties did not return to the subject in
subsequent negotiations.
Although the Supreme Court relied upon the negotiation history in finding
that Harrisburg is not inconsistent with its holding in Griggsville-Perry, we can
only speculate whether the arbitrator’s use of the “just cause” standard in applying
the terms of the bargaining agreement would have passed judicial review if there
had been no record of the negotiating history in the arbitration proceeding. This
may be a subject for future litigation over the enforcement of arbitration awards
with respect to an arbitrator’s authority to establish procedures and/or standards
for implementing ambiguous or incomplete contract provisions. Such decisions by
arbitrators are often referred to as “gap filling.”
VI. CONSIDERATION OF GRIGGSVILLE-PERRY AND
PRIOR APPELLATE COURT DECISIONS WITH RESPECT
TO PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES AND ARBITRATION AWARDS
Consideration of “public policy” was not an issue in Griggsville-Perry. The school
board had not contended that the arbitration award was unenforceable because the
board had the exclusive and unqualified right to hire and terminate
paraprofessional employees regardless of the terms of the bargaining
agreement. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to the subject matter of this article that
we review prior court decisions that have considered public policy in reviewing the
enforcement of public sector arbitration awards and the extent to which deferral
to the arbitrator has been a factor.
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The Supreme Court of Illinois addressed a public policy consideration in reviewing
public sector arbitration awards prior to the enactment of the IELRA and
IPLRA. In Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 508 v. Cook
County College Teachers Union,[31] the court held that an arbitrator’s decision
regarding the priority order for assignment of extra work of community college
teachers violated public policy and therefore was not enforceable. The Court did
not dispute the arbitrator’s interpretation and application of contract provisions
but held that teachers who had engaged in a then unlawful strike had unduly
benefitted from their illegal conduct. The extra work provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement were based upon the relative earnings of the teachers. The
teachers who had participated in the strike had earned less in the relevant pay
period than those who had not engaged in the strike. Thus, the teachers who had
struck had priority for extra work assignments under the terms of the
agreement. The court recognized that the arbitrator’s award was based upon the
terms of the agreement but the court held that the award could not be enforced
because “the benefit gained in the wake of the illegal activity is directly at the
expense of those who refrained from engaging in the illegal activity.”[32]
The Illinois Supreme Court again considered public policy in AFSCME v. State of
Illinois.[33] An arbitrator reduced the discharge of two state mental health
workers to four month disciplinary suspensions. The employees had been
discharged when a mental health patient died during their unscheduled absence
on personal affairs for over an hour. The court determined that the discharge of
the employees was not mandated by public policy. In so holding, the court relied
upon the explicit finding by the arbitrator that there was “no nexus between [the
employees'] infraction and the patient’s tragic death.”[34] The Court also stated
that “[t]he arbitrator’s order of reinstatement is specifically premised upon his
judgment that the grievants would be able to return to the useful employ of the
Employer and provide appropriate services to the residents without the likelihood
of a repetition of the occurrences of April 28, 1985.”[35]
In AFSCME v. State of Illinois the Illinois Supreme Court distinguished its
decision in Cook County College Teachers. The court held that as a matter of law
the striking teachers could not benefit from their unlawful conduct.[36] In
AFSCME v. State of Illinois although the employees’ conduct could be considered
as “mistreatment of a service recipient” their conduct did not require discharge
under state mental health legislation. Therefore, the court accepted the
arbitrator’s determination that there is no likelihood that the employees would
repeat their actions in the future.[37] Thus, in AFSCME v. State of Illinois the
Illinois Supreme Court, in addressing the public policy issue, deferred to the
arbitrator’s factual findings regarding the seriousness of the employees’ conduct
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and the prospects of their future conduct in determining whether the award
reinstating the employees was unenforceable as a matter of law.
The 1990 decision of the Appellate Court in Department of Central Management
Services v. AFSCME[38] reflects the interplay between public policy
considerations and whether the reviewing court is prepared to defer to an
arbitrator’s findings. In that case, the Appellate Court held that an arbitrator’s
decision to reinstate a discharged correctional officer who had used drugs in an off
duty social situation with a former convict was not enforceable. The arbitrator in
reinstating the employee on a “last chance” directive, including random drug
testing for two years, had considered that she had voluntarily and successfully
completed a drug rehabilitation program.[39] The Appellate Court held that public
policy regarding drug use and being a correctional officer trumped the arbitrator’s
determination that the employee could resume and meet the requirements of her
position.[40] In the same decision, the Appellate Court held that public policy
prohibited the reinstatement of two other correctional officers who had engaged in
battery with a recalcitrant prisoner on the basis that even if the officers’ actions
had been provoked and unpremeditated, any battery against a prisoner required
their discharge.[41] The arbitrator had reduced the discharges to 60 day
disciplinary suspensions having found that the “blows were provoked, not
premeditated, and resulted from spontaneous anger.”[42] The arbitrator also set
aside the discharge of two other correctional officers who had witnessed the battery
but failed to report the incident to their superiors, reducing the discipline to 15 day
suspensions. In upholding the arbitrator’s decision to reduce the discharges to
suspensions, the court noted that the failure of the correctional officers to report
the incident violated public policy but that the policy did not “require” their
discharge.[43]
The Appellate Court in Board of Education of School District U-46 v.
IELRB[44] set aside an arbitrator’s award reinstating a discharged school bus
driver. The arbitrator had found that the bus driver had driven her bus erratically
on three occasions but ordered the driver to be reinstated because the school
district had failed to follow the progressive discipline provisions of the bargaining
agreement.[45] The agreement required a sequence of disciplinary steps before
discharge except in “unusual or severe circumstances.”[46] The Appellate Court
held that public policy required “reasonable care” in transporting students and
therefore the policy overrode the progressive discipline provisions of the
agreement. The court concluded that “the grievant’s driving habits [were] both
severe and unusual.”[47] In effect, therefore, the court made an independent
determination that the record before the arbitrator substantiated that the bus
driver’s conduct was “unusual” or within the scope of “severe circumstances” and
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therefore justified discharge. However, if that were the basis of the court’s
decision, one could further conclude that the court assumed responsibility for
interpreting and applying the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. The
alternative view is that the court reached its decision by independently
determining that the bus driver’s conduct violated the standards for school bus
driving under the School Code. If that is the case, then the court assumed the role
of being the initial trier of the facts and the law based upon the record of the
arbitration proceeding. The court noted that there are statutory provisions for
revocation of a school bus driver’s license through the office of the Secretary of
State but no action had been taken to revoke. Nonetheless, the court concluded
that public policy as expressed in the School Code empowered the Court to set
aside the arbitration award.
Similarly, in County of De Witt v. AFSCME,[48] the court set aside an arbitrator’s
award reinstating to a less demanding position a nurse who hit a recalcitrant
patient. The court held that although the nurse retained her license and dismissal
was not mandated by statute, her conduct contravened public policy and therefore
her discharge must stand.
We are not making any judgement whether the arbitrator’s decision in School
District U-46 was correct or not. Rather, the Appellate Court’s decision reflects
the tension between two judicial principles: (1) an arbitrator’s award is to be
enforced if it is drawn from the “essence” of the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement and (2) the reviewing court has the authority to determine whether the
arbitrator’s award based upon the record in the arbitration proceeding contravenes
the court’s determination of public policy.
The willingness of the courts to balance public policy considerations with an
arbitrator’s findings, as reflected in the above cited cases, is to be distinguished
from decisions by the Illinois Appellate Courts holding that specific provisions of
a collective bargaining agreement are in conflict with statutes other than the Labor
Acts and therefore unenforceable. For example, in City of DeKalb v. International
Association of Fire Fighters, Local 1236,[49] the Appellate Court held that an
arbitration award was not enforceable because it violated a statute providing for
uniform pension benefits to Illinois fire fighters. In 1994, the Appellate Court,
in Board of Education of Rockford School District No. 205 v. IELRB,[50] held that
the dismissal of tenured public school teachers are solely governed by the
procedures of the Illinois School Code, are not permissible subjects for collective
bargaining and arbitration decisions implementing such contract provisions are
not enforceable. Similarly, in Midwest Central Education Ass’n v. IELRB,[51] the
court held that an arbitrator had no authority to reinstate a teacher who not been
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renewed for employment although the procedural provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement had not been followed, and in Barrington Community
School District No. 220 v. Special Education District of Lake County,[52] the
court held that under the School Code a school district alone had authority to fill
teacher positions rather than a jointly administered special education cooperative.
This line of authority is not within the scope of whether an arbitrator’s decision is
based upon the language of a collective bargaining agreement but, rather,
considers whether the terms themselves are ultra vires.[53]
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Illinois in Griggsville-Perry intended to send a clear
message that public sector arbitration awards are to be enforced and protracted
litigation contesting the enforcement of awards is not favored. The decision also,
by implication, instructs arbitrators to base their opinions and awards on specific
contract language even if the arbitrator is utilizing the arbitrator’s own standards
in applying the terms of an agreement. The same instruction applies to the parties
in submitting the contested issues of contract interpretation and application to the
arbitrator.
The court’s adoption of the Appellate Court’s Harrisburg decision is also
instructive to those who negotiate public sector collective bargaining
agreements. Contract proposals which are advanced but not adopted can affect the
application and enforcement of ambiguous and incomplete terms which are
incorporated into an agreement.
Although the Supreme Court did not address public policy considerations
in Griggsville-Perry, it is fair to postulate that the court will defer to an arbitrator’s
determination based upon the arbitration record that an employee’s conduct has
not prevented the employee from performing the prescribed duties and
responsibilities of the position. We will not predict how and when the Illinois
Supreme Court will deal with that type of issue in considering the enforcement of
arbitration awards. However, if public policy has been raised or the potential
exists, as a challenge to an arbitration award, there is value in an arbitrator
explicitly addressing the issue in the opinion and award.
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[47] Id. at 1006, 576 N.E.2d at 481.
[48] 298 Ill. App. 3d 634, 699 N.E.2d 163 (4th Dist. 1998).
[49] 182 Ill. App. 3d 367, 538 N.E.2d 867 (2d Dist. 1989).
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[53] See also Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees v. IELRB, 218 Ill. App. 3d
293, 741 N.E.2d 989 (1st Dist. 2000), vacated and remanded on other
grounds 195 Ill. 2d 549, 754 N.E.2d 1281 (2001) (upholding an arbitrator’s award
reinstating a laid off teacher to active employment in conformity with provisions
of the collective bargaining agreement, contrasting that situation with one in which
a teacher is dismissed for cause); Chicago Teachers Union v. IELRB, 334 Ill. App.
3d 936, 778 N.E.2d 1232 (1st Dist. 2002) (holding that provisions of a collective
bargaining agreement establishing the priority for teacher summer school work
was enforceable because it did not contravene the school board’s statutory
authority to assign teachers to specific classes).
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
By, Student Editorial Board:
Marco Berrios, Kelly Carson, Alec Hausermann and,
Stephanie Ridella
Recent Developments is a regular feature of The Illinois Public Employee Relations
Report. It highlights recent legal developments of interest to the public
employment relations community. This issue focuses on developments under the
public employee collective bargaining statutes.
I.

IELRA DEVELOPMENTS

A.

Duty of Fair Representation

In Green v. IFT Local 604, 2013 WL 3934224 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2013), the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, in the context of a Title VII
lawsuit, held that the union did not breach its duty of fair representation when it
refused to represent a teacher in a tenured teacher dismissal proceeding under the
Illinois School Code. Green, a member of Local 604, was dismissed from his job
as a physical education teacher under the Teacher Tenure Act. Green asked the
union to represent him in the Tenure Act proceedings before the Illinois State
Board of Education.
Counsel for the union advised Green that neither the union nor its legal counsel
could represent him, because he had repeatedly instituted litigation against the
union and its legal counsel had represented it in those cases. Counsel further
noted that Green owned his claim under the Tenure Act, that conflict of interest
rules applied, and that the union had no duty of fair representation with respect to
his claim.
Green filed an unfair labor practice charge against the union with the IELRB
alleging that the union violated Section 14(b)(1) of the Act by refusing to represent
him in his proceeding before the ISBE. The IELRB rejected Green’s claims because
his Tenure Act proceeding did not arise out of the collective bargaining agreement
(CBA), and therefore the union had no duty to represent him. Then Green filed a
Title VII claim against the union in federal court.
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The court ruled that to establish a Title VII claim against a union, a member must
show that: (1) the union violated the collective bargaining agreement between the
union and the employer; (2) that the union breached its duty of fair representation
by letting the breach go unrepaired; and (3) some evidence that indicates that
discriminatory animus motivated the union. The court agreed with the union that
Green failed to show that it violated the CBA. The court reasoned that Green’s
allegations arose out of the Union’s refusal to represent him in challenging his
dismissal under the Tenure Act, not a breach of the CBA. The court also found that
the duty of fair representation under section 14(b)(1) of the IELRB did not attach
to Green’s Tenure Act proceedings because it took place outside of the union’s
position as Green’s exclusive bargaining representative.
II. IPLRA DEVELOPMENTS
A.

Protected Concerted Activity

In Hazel Crest Professional Firefighters Association, IAFF Local 4087 and Village
of Hazel Crest, No. S-CA-13-005 (ILRB State Panel, 2013), the ILRB State Panel
held that hanging a banner at a fire station and the placement of decals on fire
trucks was concerted activity, but was not protected activity under the
IPLRA. Beginning in 2002, the Association hung a banner in one of the fire
stations and placed decals on fire trucks. In 2011, a new city manager, after an
extensive review of the collective bargaining agreement, village ordinances and
codes, and the minutes of the previous five to six years of village trustees meetings,
ordered the banner and decals removed because such displays were inappropriate
in government workplaces.
The State Panel, balancing the employer’s managerial decision-making power and
property rights against public employees’ right to engage in concerted activity, held
in favor of the employer’s right to control whether the banner and decals were
displayed on its property. The Panel cited a number of NLRB precedents where
the Board held in favor of employer property rights when the issue was the use of
employer equipment in the exercise of otherwise protected, concerted activity. The
Association did not present persuasive evidence that the removal was motivated
by discriminatory animus, and absent such evidence could not prevail.
B. Representation Proceedings

In Auer and Town of Normal (Public Works Department) and Laborers Int’l
Union of North America, Case No. S-RD-12-006, 30 PERI ¶ 32 (ILRB State Panel
2013), the ILRB State Panel, in a 3-2 decision, rejected the ALJ’s recommendation
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that the incumbent union had prevailed in a decertification election on the basis
that two challenged ballots were cast by ineligible voters, and therefore, should not
be counted.
Out of the forty ballots already counted, twenty were for the incumbent, nineteen
were against, and one was void. Thus, the two challenged ballots could affect the
election outcome.
The petitioner, who was one of the employees whose ballots were challenged, and
employer argued that although the two ballot casters in question were not on the
active roster of employees, they had a reasonable expectation of future
employment, and therefore, their ballots should be counted. In contrast, the
incumbent union argued that the two ballot casters did not have a reasonable
expectation of future employment.
The State Panel noted that to be considered in a bargaining unit, and eligible to
vote, a person must only have a reasonable expectation of future employment. The
two ballot casters at issue were hired as six month employees whose terms ended
a few weeks prior to the election. If the term employees wished to work the next
year they had to fill out a new application every cycle, but it was indicated by the
employer that if term employees did a good job, term employees’ prospects of being
rehired were good.
In coming to the conclusion that the two ballot casters did have a reasonable
expectation of future employment, the ILRB accepted the four factors identified by
the ALJ, which were used in practice by the NLRB, but the ILRB’s use of the factors
led it to a different conclusion than the ALJ. The four factors identified by the ALJ
and adopted by the ILRB for considering whether someone has a reasonable
expectation of future employment are: 1) the employer’s past experiences; 2) the
employer’s future plans; 3) the circumstances surrounding the layoff; and 4) what
the employee was told about the likelihood of recall.
The ILRB agreed with the ALJ that the employer’s future plans were unclear, but
disagreed that this made the second factor weigh against a finding of a reasonable
expectation, and rather, found the second factor to have neutral weight. The ILRB
agreed with the ALJ that the third factor strongly weighed against any reasonable
expectation of future employment because the ballot casters were term employees
with a definite end date to their employment. However, the ILRB also determined
the ALJ had erred in finding the first and fourth factors weighed against a
reasonable expectation, and determined that both actually weighed in favor of one.
The first weighed in favor of a reasonable expectation because the employer did
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have a history of rehiring its term employees, specifically ones who had performed
well like the two ballot casters. Finally, the fourth factor favored finding a
reasonable expectation of rehire because there was almost certainly going to be
work that needed to be performed and the town itself was unlikely to go out of
business. In addition, the ballot casters had been told that they had done a good
job and the employer would like to have them back.
Weighing these factor, the ILRB found that the two ballot casters did have a
reasonable expectation for future employment, and therefore, rejected the ALJ’s
recommendation and ordered the two ballots to be opened and counted and the
results of the decertification petition be retabulated.

